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THE MERGER OF COMMON-LAW AND EQUITY
PLEADING IN VIRGINIA
W. Hamilton Bryson *
As of January 1, 2006, all civil actions governed by the Rules of
Court of the Supreme Court of Virginia are pleaded by a single
form of action,' and the parties can put into one single action all
causes of action sounding in common law, equity, and admiralty
so far as permitted by the law of joinder of actions.2 The Rules of
Court, however, do not apply to causes of action for which the
procedure is provided by statute, such as mandamus,3 prohibi-
tion,4 quo warranto,5 eminent domain condemnations,6 probate,
and habeas corpus.' Substantive rights, whether sounding in
common law, equity, probate, divorce, admiralty, or whatever,
remain as before.
The English common law and equity are separate bodies of
substantive law, although they are interconnecting. The proce-
dural law by which these different substantive bodies of law are
put into effect can be the same or different, and the courts can be
the same or different. Over the past five centuries or so, the Eng-
lish legal establishment developed in such a way that some courts
had only common-law jurisdiction, such as the Court of King's
Bench9 and the Court of Common Pleas. ° Some courts had a
* Blackstone Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. B.A., 1963,
Hampden-Sydney College; LL.B., 1967, Harvard Law School; LL.M., 1968, University of
Virginia School of Law; Ph.D., 1972, University of Cambridge.
1. VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:1.
2. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-221, -272, -281 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006); VA.
SUP. CT. R. 1:4(k), 1:6.
3. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-644 to -653.1 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006).
4. Id.
5. Id. §§ 8.01-635 to -643 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
6. Id. §§ 25.1-205 to -222 (Repl. Vol. 2006).
7. Id. §§ 64.1-75 to -93 (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Cum. Supp. 2006).
8. Id. §§ 8.01-654 to -668 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006).
9. See MARJORIE BLATCHER, THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH, 1450-1550: A STUDY IN
SELF-HELP 1-9 (1978).
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fused jurisdiction, such as the Court of Chancery, which was pri-
marily a court of equity,' 1 but it had a limited common-law juris-
diction in matters involving litigation against officers of the
King.12 The Court of Exchequer, between the mid-sixteenth cen-
tury and 1841, heard both common-law and equity cases with the
jurisdictions and lawsuits being kept strictly separate.13 This was
the situation of the trial courts in Virginia from their beginning
in the early seventeenth century until 2006, except for the period
of 1777 to 1831 when there were courts of chancery that had eq-
uity jurisdiction only. 14 Another alternative is to have a merged
system whereby common-law and equity claims are pleaded the
same way in a single method of pleading, whether the plaintiff
has a common-law right or an equitable one or both. The merged
system of pleading has always been used in Texas.1" It was
adopted in New York by the Field Code of 1848.16 It has been
used in England and Wales since the Judicature Act of 1873,17 in
the federal courts of the United States since the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure of 1938,8 and now in Virginia as of 2006.19
The merger of common-law and equity procedure in Virginia
has proceeded incrementally over a long period of time. In Vir-
ginia, there were never any institutional rivalries, jealousies, or
competition for fees, as happened in England, since there was a
10. See MARGARET HASTINGS, THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS IN FIFTEENTH CENTURY
ENGLAND: A STUDY OF LEGAL ADMINISTRATION AND PROCEDURE 16-27 (1947).
11. See generally W.J. JONES, THE ELIZABETHAN COURT OF CHANCERY 418-22 (1967);
CONWAY ROBINSON, HISTORY OF THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY (photo. reprint 2002)
(1882); GEORGE SPENCE, THE EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY
(Philadelphia, Lea and Blanchard 1846).
12. See W.S. Holdsworth, The History of Remedies Against the Crown (pts. 1 & 2), 38
L.Q. REV. 141, 280 (1922).
13. See W.H. BRYSON, THE EQUITY SIDE OF THE EXCHEQUER: ITS JURISDICTION,
ADMINISTRATION, PROCEDURES, AND RECORDS 9-27, 160-66 (1975).
14. Act of Apr. 16, 1831, ch.11, 1830-31 Va. Acts 42; Act of Oct. 2, 1777, ch. 15, re-
printed in 9 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA
389-90 (photo. reprint 1969) (William Waller Hening ed., Richmond, J. & G. Cochran
1821).
15. See 1846 Tex. Gen. Laws 363; Smith v. Clopton, 4 Tex. 109, 113 (1849); 1 TEX.
JUR. Actions § 55 (2004).
16. 1848 N.Y. Laws 521; see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 103(a) (Consol. 1999). This change was
soon followed by many other common law jurisdictions. William D. Mitchell, The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, CENTENARY ESSAYS 73, 73-74 (Alison
Reppy ed., 1949).
17. Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66, § 24 (Eng.).
18. FED. R. CIV. P. 2 advisory committee's note.
19. VA. SuP. CT. R. 3:1.
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fused system of courts. From the beginning of the colonial courts,
the judges and the clerks of the court were the same, whether the
plaintiff filed an action at law or a suit in equity. The incremental
merger of common-law and equity procedure in Virginia has pro-
ceeded as follows.
If a party in equity desires a jury, a court of equity can sum-
mon an advisory jury, whose verdict the equity judge will nor-
mally follow.2" De bene esse depositions have been allowed at
common law since 1645.21 Since 1788, a common-law writ of fieri
facias has been available to enforce a final order in equity for the
payment of a sum certain;22 this legislation gave the courts of eq-
uity an in rem power. From 1792, equity courts could appoint spe-
cial commissioners to execute a common-law conveyance. 23 Pre-
trial discovery has been allowed in common-law actions by means
of interrogatories since 1831.24 Statutory interpleader by a stake-
holder, an ancient equitable remedy, has been available in com-
mon-law actions since 1849.25 Ever since 1873, equitable defenses
could be pleaded in actions at common law sounding in contract.26
In 1922, the declaratory judgment act was enacted in order to al-
low actions at law with a right of trial by jury, giving the same re-
lief in substance as a bill in equity quia timet allowing a plaintiff
to get a judgment of his or her rights before any damage is done.2"
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-336(E) (Cum. Supp. 2006); VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:22(c)(1). These
provisions merely restate the traditional equity practice. See 1 R.T. BARTON, PLEADING
AND PRACTICE IN THE COURTS OF CHANCERY 493-517 (Robert T. Barton, Jr. ed., 3d ed.
1926); EDWIN B. MEADE, LILE'S EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE 145-47 (3d. ed. 1952); 2
CONWAY ROBINSON, PRACTICE IN THE COURTS OF LAW AND EQUITY IN VIRGINIA 352-58
(Richmond, Samuel Shepherd 1835).
21. Act of Nov. 20, 1645, Act 10, reprinted in 1 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A
COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 303-04 (photo. reprint 1969) (William Waller
Hening ed., New York, R. & W. & G. Bartow 1823); see, e.g., VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:7(a)(4); Min-
nis v. Echols, 12 Va. (2 Hen. & M.) 31 (1808).
22. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-426, -427, -466 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006); VA.
CODE ch. 186, § 1 (1849); Act of Jan. 5, 1788, ch. 10, § 4, reprinted in 12 THE STATUTES AT
LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 473 (photo. reprint 1969) (Wil-
liam Waller Hening ed., Richmond, George Cochran 1823).
23. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-110, -111 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006); Act of Dec.
13, 1792, ch. 90, 1792 Va. Acts 167, reprinted in 1 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA
84-88 (photo. reprint 1970) (Samuel Shepherd ed., New York, AMS Press 1835).
24. Act of Apr. 16, 1831, ch. 11, 1830-31 Va. Acts 42; see, e.g., Poindexter v. Davis, 47
Va. (6 Gratt.) 481, 483 (1850); Vaughn v. Garland, 38 Va. (11 Leigh) 251, 251 (1840);
M'Farland v. Hunter, 35 Va. (8 Leigh) 489, 489 (1836); see also VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:8.
25. VA. CODE ch. 152, § 1 (1849).
26. Act of Mar. 22, 1873, ch. 216, 1872-73 Va. Acts 196; see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-422
(Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006).
27. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-184 (Rep). Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006); Act of Mar. 28,
2006]
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Originally, the courts of equity received the testimony of wit-
nesses only in the written form of depositions. Since 1930, how-
ever, evidence in a suit in equity can be taken ore tenus.28 The
equity procedure of discovery depositions has been allowed at
common law since 1954,29 and a plaintiff in equity can suffer a
nonsuit. 30 The equity procedure of intervention has recently been
allowed at common law. 1 Now, the procedures for pleading cases
at common law and in equity are merged into a single form of ac-
tion.32
However, this merger is not the universal panacea for all of the
problems of pleading and practice. In the past Virginia practice,
where law and equity were not merged, when the plaintiff filed a
lawsuit, the clerk had to be told whether to docket it on the com-
mon-law side of the court or the equity side. Now the clerk has to
know which it would have been because, if equity relief solely is
requested, there will be a different filing fee than where common-
law relief is demanded.3 3 Formerly, the defendant might demur
on the ground that the action was filed on the wrong side of the
court, and then the court had to decide whether the plaintiffs
claim was one of common law or one of equity. In the current
practice, where law and equity procedures are merged, when the
plaintiff files a civil action and demands a trial by jury, the de-
fendant may move the court to strike the demand for a jury be-
cause the plaintiff is seeking equitable relief,3 4 and now the court
must decide whether the plaintiffs claim would have been one of
common law or one of equity but for the merger.
In an action sounding in contract, is the plaintiff entitled to the
equitable relief of specific performance, or are monetary damages
at common law an adequate and complete remedy? This is still
problematical because a claimant is not always entitled to an eq-
1922, ch. 517, 1922 Va. Acts 902; see, e.g., Patterson's Ex'rs v. Patterson, 144 Va. 113, 131
S.E. 217 (1926).
28. Act of Mar. 20, 1930, ch. 132, 1930 Va. Acts 346; see VA. SUP. CT. R. 2:17 (repealed
2006); see, e.g., Armstrong v. Bryant, 189 Va. 760, 764-65, 55 S.E.2d 5, 6-7 (1949).
29. VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:23(c) (current version at VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:5).
30. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-380(A) (Cum. Supp. 2006); see VA. CODE ANN. § 8-220 (Repl.
Vol. 1957); Act of Apr. 1, 1954, ch. 333, 1954 Va. Acts 411; see also Moore v. Moore, 218 Va.
790, 795 & n.4, 240 S.E.2d 535, 538 & n.4 (1978).
31. VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:19 (current version at VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:14).
32. VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:1.
33. VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-275(13), (26) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
34. VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:21, 3:22.
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uitable remedy in order to right a wrong. A person is only so enti-
tled if the common-law remedy is inadequate or incomplete.3" A
bill of review lies only to judgments that determine equitable
claims, not common-law ones.36 Thus, before and after the merger
of law and equity pleading, the same issues cannot be avoided,
but must be confronted.
In addition, some issues have now been created for the courts
to decide. If the plaintiff needs both common-law relief and an
equitable remedy to have complete justice done, this is available
on the equity side of the court under the "clean-up doctrine.""
"No question is better settled than that where a court of equity
has jurisdiction for one purpose, it will not send the parties back
to a court of law, but will retain the jurisdiction for all purposes,
and do complete justice between the parties.... 3 In such a case,
the parties were not entitled to a trial by a common-law jury be-
cause the suit was one in equity.39 However, in the federal courts,
the right to trial by jury on the common-law issues has been
granted, which changed the traditional practice.4 ° The new Vir-
ginia rules of pleading are not intended to extend the right to
trial by jury, and this is clearly stated. According to Rule 3:21(a),
"The right of trial by jury.., is unchanged by these rules."4 The
idea of jury trials in domestic relations cases, for example, is not
35. See, e.g., Lanston Monotype Mach. Co. v. Times-Dispatch Co., 115 Va. 797, 805, 80
S.E. 736, 738 (1914); Alderson v. Biggars, 14 Va. (4 Hen. & M.) 470, 470-71 (1809); Yancy
v. Fenwick, 14 Va. (4 Hen. & M.) 423, 423-24 (1809); Sowers v. Hamilton Dev. Co., 14 Va.
Cir. 311, 313 (Cir. Ct. 1989) (Chesterfield County). See generally W. HAMILTON BRYSON,
BRYSON ON VIRGINIA CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.02[2] (4th ed. 2005).
36. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-623 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006) (restating the tra-
ditional practice, but giving a time limit); see also 1 BARTON, supra note 20, at 302-14;
MEADE, supra note 20, at 94-102; 2 ROBINSON, supra note 20, at 417.
37. See, e.g., Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. First Nat'l Exch. Bank, 213 Va. 531, 538,
193 S.E.2d 678, 684 (1973); Dobie v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 164 Va. 464, 475, 180 S.E. 289,
293 (1935); Harris v. Thomas, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 18, 19 (1806); Beacon Masonry Co. v.
Eugene Simpson & Brother, Inc., 23 Va. Cir. 270, 271 (Cir. Ct. 1991) (Alexandria City);
Pillis v. Nash, 2 Va. Cir. 377, 379 (Cir. Ct. 1973) (Richmond City).
38. 7A MICHIE'S JURISPRUDENCE OF VIRGINIA AND WEST VIRGINIA Equity § 12 (2006)
(citing many Virginia cases).
39. See, e.g., Builders Floor Serv., Inc. v. Kirby, 60 Va. Cir. 171, 176, 178 (Cir. Ct.
2002) (Fairfax County).
40. See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 479 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 508 (1959). "In effect, the Beacon Theatres approach results in a
greater availability of jury trial than before the merger of law and equity." LARRY L. TEPLY
& RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 881 (3d ed. 2004).
41. VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:2 1(a).
2006]
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at all a good one.42 Will the Virginia courts follow the federal
courts in expanding the right to a common-law jury to cases that
were formerly on the equity side of the court under the clean-up
doctrine? The new Virginia Rules 3:21(b) and (c) and 3:22(a) ap-
pear to anticipate this change.4 3 Indeed, these rules are copied
from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 38(b) and (c) and
39(a).44
Can punitive damages be awarded in actions sounding in eq-
uity? Such damages are absolutely forbidden in the well-
established equity practice. 45 Further, discovery was originally
only allowed in equity and, since the courts of equity would never
give criminal or quasi-criminal punitive awards, they refused to
allow discovery which might lead to either, even though such
sanctions might be given by the common-law courts.46 However,
the modern practice has allowed discovery leading to punitive
damages in common-law actions, though they have continued to
maintain the prohibition of discovery leading to self-incrimination
and civil forfeitures.47 It appears to this writer that punitive
damages and civil forfeitures are the same. As Chief Justice John
Marshall said, "The rule clearly is, that a party is not bound to
make any discovery which would expose him to penalties."4' Lord
Chancellor Hardwicke said, "[T]here is no rule more established
in equity, than that a person shall not be obliged to discover what
will subject him to a penalty, or any thing in the nature of a pen-
alty."49 The current practice seems to this writer to be contrary to
this long-established and most salutary principle of law.
The clean-up doctrine would never have allowed a claim for
punitive damages to be added to an equitable claim. Can it now?
These riddles will in due time be solved by the Virginia courts
in the course of litigation in the next few years.
42. See, e.g., Moore v. Moore, 61 Va. Cir. 668 (Cir. Ct. 2002) (Roanoke City).
43. VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:21(b), (c), 3:22(a).
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(b), (c), 39(a).
45. See, e.g., Colonna Dry Dock Co. v. Colonna, 108 Va. 230, 240-44, 61 S.E. 770, 774-
75 (1908); Wojcik v. Burgess, 40 Va. Cir. 96, 103 (Cir. Ct. 1995) (Warren County); Winslow
v. Sadler, 16 Va. Cir. 493, 499 (Cir. Ct. 1980) (Alexandria City); Evans v. Offitt, 6 Va. Cir.
528, 531 (Cir. Ct. 1978) (Arlington County); Pillis v. Nash, 2 Va. Cir. 377, 380 (Cir. Ct.
1973) (Richmond City).
46. See, e.g., Poindexter v. Davis, 47 Va. (6 Gratt.) 481, 490-91 (1850).
47. BRYSON, supra note 35, § 9.04[1].
48. United States v. Saline Bank of Va., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 100, 104 (1828).
49. Smith v. Read, 1 Atkyns 526, 527, 26 Eng. Rep. 332, West temp. Hardwicke 16,
17, 25 Eng. Rep. 796 (Ch. 1737).
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